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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1981-1982
A Symposium
[Editor's Note. Developments in the Law continues to reflect coverage beyond the
work of Louisiana's appellate courts and includes coverage of legislative amendments
to Louisiana and federal statutes and decisions of interest to the Louisiana lawyer.
This year's symposium includes cases reported from April 1, 1981 through July 31, 1982.]
ADMIRALTY
Frank L. Maraist*
THE JURISDICTION OF ADMIRALTY
Until 1970, the generally accepted rule was that if a tort occur-
red on navigable waters, it was maritime. In the oft-quoted language
of The Plymouth,1 "[e]very species of tort, however occurring, and
whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable
waters, is of admiralty cognizance."' In 1970 the Supreme Court, in
the celebrated Executive Jet3 case, soundly criticized the "locality alone"
test and repudiated it in cases involving aircraft crashes; those cases,
the Court concluded, did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction in the
absence of a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."'
The Court stopped short of a general repudiation of the "locality alone"
test, but lower courts have been unanimous in their post-Executive
Jet view that no tort falls within admiralty jurisdiction unless it has
the requisite "maritime flavor."5
Recently, in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson,6 the Supreme
Court was presented with the issue of whether a collision between
two pleasure boats on navigable waters fell within maritime jurisdic-
tion. In concluding that it did, the Court expressly confirmed what
it had implied in Executive Jet: the requirement that the wrong have
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
2. Id. at 36.
3. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
4. Id. at 268.
5. See, e.g., Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co.,
644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975).
6. 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982).
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a significant connection with traditional maritime activity is not limited
to the aviation context, but applies to all torts.
After confirming the broad reach of Executive Jet, the Richard-
son Court addressed an issue spawned by the confirmation: whether
"traditional maritime activity" means "commercial activity." The lower
court's findings of fact left no room for an inconclusive decision; the
district court had found that there was "no evidence to indicate that
any 'commercial activity,' even in the broadest admiralty sense, had
ever been previously engaged in by either of the boats in question"
and "[tihere was no other instrumentality involved ... that had even
a minor relationship to 'admiralty' or 'commerce.'"' The Supreme
Court rejected the argument that commercial activity is essential to
a finding of "maritime flavor," observing that "[tihe federal interest
in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately served if ad-
miralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually engaged
in commercial maritime activity. This interest can be fully vindicated
only if all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to
uniform rules of conduct."8 This need for adherence to uniform sailing
rules, coupled with the "potential disruptive impact" of a collision on
navigable waters, produces a sufficient nexus with traditional maritime
activity to sustain admiralty jurisdiction.
Foremost thus answers one of the questions about maritime tort
jurisdiction that frequently arises. The decision also suggests the
answer to another question: what happens when there is a collision
between a pleasure boat and a non-vessel, such as a swimmer, a dock,
or a piling? The Court hints that both it and Congress (through that
body's broad definition of a "vessel" which must comply with ship-
ping laws and with the "rules of the road") adhere to the view that
"the smooth flow of maritime commerce is promoted when all vessel
operators are subject to the same duties and liabilities."9 Thus any
collision or allision on navigable waters apparently will be governed
by maritime tort law. This may mean, as the dissenters suggest,"
that most torts occurring on navigable waters will have a sufficient
nexus with traditional maritime activity. Thus the "locality alone" test,
jettisoned in Executive Jet, may have surfaced again as the "locality
plus nexus" test, leaving behind only a few "swimmer-surfboarder"
type cases and those claims arising out of crashes of land-based planes
on territorial waters while on flights between two points within the
continental United States.
7. Id. at 2657.
8. Id. at 2659 (emphasis by the court).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2663 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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After Executive Jet and Foremost, "maritime flavor" is an essen-
tial element of a maritime tort. Must the tort also occur on navigable
waters or is "maritime flavor" alone sufficient in some cases? The
conventional wisdom (and the better reading) of Executive Jet and
Foremost1 is that both "flavor" and "locality" are required unless, of
course, the tort falls within the reach of the Admiralty Extension Act.
12
Where tortious conduct prevents a seaman's employment, there
arguably is no "locality" and thus no maritime tort. Arguably, the
tort has its "impact" on navigable waters and thus there is "locality,"
but such an expansive interpretation of "locality" would make a
shambles of this requirement. For example, it would bring into
maritime law claims for inland damage to goods destined for ocean
shipment. A seaman's employment, however, is the "stuff" of which
admiralty is made and is much too important to be left to the vagaries
of state law.
Some lower court decisions have held that tortious interference
with a seaman's contract of employment is a maritime tort.'" The latest
such decision is Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc." In Smith,
the court held that an employer's discharge of a seaman in retalia-
tion for the latter's pursuit of his compensation remedies constituted
a maritime tort. The seaman's remedy for retaliatory discharge that
is sanctioned in Smith is narrowly circumscribed. He must establish
that the employer's decision was motivated in substantial part by the
knowledge that the seaman has filed or intends to file the personal
injury action against the employer. Punitive damages are not
recoverable. The compensatory damages to which the seaman is en-
titled include mental anguish, the expense of securing new employ-
ment, lost earnings while seeking the new position, and any lost future
earnings if the new employment provides less compensation than that
earned while in the employ of the discharging employer.
The jurisdictional issue perhaps could be handled better by
treating retaliatory discharge as a breach of the seaman's contract
of employment, thus preserving inviolate the dual requirements of
"locality" and "flavor." However, none should quarrel with the net
result-maritime law now governs the imposition of sanctions against
an employer for the retaliatory discharge of a seaman.
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1982).
12. 46 U.S.C. S 740 (1976). The Act applies if the damages are "caused by a vessel
on navigable water," although the damages may occur on land.
13. See; e.g., Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4 (Ist Cir. 1975).
14. 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981). See als9 Note, Retaliatory Discharge of Seamen:
Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 43 LA. L. REV. 221 (1982).
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INDEMNITY
Maritime law generally enforces contractual indemnity, even where
the indemnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee against the latter's
negligence."6 One important exception is that a vessel owner may not
enforce contractual indemnity against a maritime employer for
damages sustained by the latter's employee. Section 905(b) of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provides that
"[iln the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused
by the negligence of a vessel .. . the employer shall not be liable
to the vessel for such damages ...and any agreements or warran-
ties to the contrary shall be void."'6 If the party who obtains the con-
tractual indemnity from the maritime employer is not a vessel, sec-
tion 905(b) is inapplicable. Section 905(a), however, provides that "[tihe
liability of an employer [for compensation benefits to the worker] shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to
.. anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer
... on account of such injury or death ...'"'. This language arguably
prohibits any contractual indemnification by a maritime employer for
injuries to his employee, as the indemnification would be "on account
of" the injury to the employee. The Fifth Circuit, however, has taken
the position that in such a case the indemnification is "on account
of" the contract and not the employee's injury, and thus it would not
be barred by section 905(a).1
Under the doctrine announced in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atlantic Steamship Corp.,"6 a maritime employer owes to the vessel
for which it is providing maritime services the implied warranty that
it will perform those services in a workmanlike manner. This warran-
ty of workmanlike performance was created by judicial fiat to remedy
an obvious injustice. Under the Sieracki" doctrine, a vessel owner
owed the warranty of seaworthiness to the employees of a maritime
employer performing services aboard the vessel. The warranty ex-
tended to temporary unseaworthy conditions created solely by the
negligence of the maritime employer. Since the maritime employer
was immune to a claim for contribution" and there frequently was
no written contract between the vessel and the employer, imposition
of the implied warranty achieved substantial justice.
15. See, e.g., Wedlock v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 554 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1977).
See also Note, Contractual Indemnity Under Maritime and Louisiana Law, 43 LA. L.
REV. 189 (1982).
16. 33 U.S.C. S 905(b) (1976).
17. 33 U.S.C. S 905(a) (1976).
18. Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981).
19. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
20. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
21. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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In the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, the vessel owner shed the Sieracki yoke
and the maritime employer was freed from the Ryan doctrine.' The
amendments did not specifically overrule Sieracki and Ryan, however,
but merely provided that those doctrines did not apply in suits be-
tween vessel owner, maritime employer, and maritime employee.23
However, in the interim between the Ryan decision and the 1972
amendments, lower courts had applied the warranty of workmanlike
performance to contracts for maritime services other than those be-
tween vessel owner and maritime employer.24 An unanswered ques-
tion is whether the warranty has survived the demise of the unique
situation from which it sprang.
In Gator Marine Service Towing, Inc. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,"
the Fifth Circuit was asked to apply the warranty to an indemnity
action between a vessel and a marine service contractor who was not
the employer of the injured claimant. The court, noting that there
was "little logical appeal in [the] proposed extension of a doctrine so
withered,"' concluded that the dispute would be "best accommodated
by a straightforward application of the usual maritime comparative
fault system." 7 The same court reached a similar result in a subse-
quent case."
The advent of comparative contribution 9 also has led the Fifth
Circuit to scuttle another indemnity doctrine, that based on the "active
fault" of one tortfeasor and the "passive fault" of the other." The
"active/passive" rule had been applied frequently by the lower federal
courts during the period in which contribution among joint tortfeasors
in admiralty was either disallowed or was permitted only on a per
22. 33 U.S.C. S 901 (1976).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976):
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel . . . the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary
shall be void . . . . The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be
based upon the warranty of seaworthiness.
24. See, e.g., Parfait v. Jahncke Serv., Inc., 484 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1973) (diesel
engine repair service contractor); Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle Offshore Co., 446 F.2d
394 (5th Cir. 1971) (drill pipe contractor); Lusich v. Bloomfield S.S. Co., 355 F.2d 770
(5th Cir. 1966) (ship repair contractor).
25. 651 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 1100.
27. Id.
28. Agrico Chem. Co. v. M/V Ben W. Martin, 664 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
30. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 51, at 312 (4th ed.
1971).
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capita basis.31 Supreme Court and lower court decisions in recent years,
however, have established firmly the rule of comparative contribu-
tion on the basis of percentage of fault. Since the "active/passive"
theory is simply a way of equitably shifting the loss from the lesser
wrongdoer to the greater wrongdoer when the loss can not be pro-
rated on the basis of comparative fault, the adoption of comparative
contribution makes this doctrine superfluous. The Fifth Circuit, in
Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc.," ruled that the doctrine of
"active/passive fault" indemnification no longer applies in admiralty.
The Loose ruling most likely will be generally accepted in maritime
law.
SEAMEN
Seaman Status
A worker achieves seaman status only if he is more or less per-
manently connected to or performs a significant amount of his work
aboard a "vessel."3 Seaman status usually hinges upon the connexity
between the worker and the vessel, but occasionally the key issue
is whether the structure with which the worker is connected is in
fact a vessel. One common problem is the status of the helicopter
pilot who ferries workers and supplies from shore-based installations
to movable rigs or fixed platforms. Usually, he will not qualify as a
seaman because the structure with which he is connected-the
helicopter-is not a "vessel." 4 This result is anomalous, since a
helicopter ferrying men and supplies to the Outer Continental Shelf
is performing the same function as a vessel and is subject to most
of the same "perils of the sea." The first breakthrough came in Barger
v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,35 in which the court treated a helicopter
as a "vessel" for the purpose of qualifying its pilot as a seaman. The
facts of the case were strong, however; the helicopter was equipped
with permanently affixed pontoons, the pilot underwent extensive
training on how to land, taxi, and take-off from water, and the
31. E.g., Cotten v. Two "R" Drilling Co., 508 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Kelloch
v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767, 769 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The passively
negligent tortfeasor is clearly entitled to total indemnity from the actively negligent
party."); Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 181
(5th Cir. 1969) ("the right of indemnity exists between parties, one of whom is guilty
of active or affirmative negligence, while the other's fault is only technical or passive").
32. 670 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1982).
33. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY S 6-21 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]; 1B A. SANN, S. BELLMAN, N. GOLDEN, & B. CHASE,
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 11a (7th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY].
34. See Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977).
35. 514 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
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helicopter was used almost exclusively in transporting personnel to
and from oil drilling platforms on navigable waters.
Any hope that Barger might signal recognition of aircraft as
"vessels" for the purpose of determining seaman status was dashed
by the Fifth Circuit's subsequent decision in Smith v. Pan Air Corp.36
In that case, the court held that a plane equipped to take off from
either land or water and which was engaged in ferrying workers from
Louisiana to locations offshore was not a vessel for purposes of the
Jones Act."
In the Fifth Circuit, a worker, at the same point in time, can have
seaman status as to one defendant but not as to another. In Dupre
v. Otis Engineering Corp.,' the court held that a seaman loaned by
his employer to the defendant to act as a temporary substitute per-
forming non-seaman's work on dry land was not a seaman as to the
defendant, regardless of the plaintiffs status as to his employer.
Even more recently, in Burks v. American River Transportation
Co., 39 the Fifth Circuit reached the same basic conclusion. In Burks,
the plaintiff performed most of his work on his employer's barge,
which was specially equipped to discharge bulk cargo from other
barges directly into oceangoing vessels. In performing his duties, the
plaintiff went aboard the defendant's barge, which was being unloaded,
and was injured when a hatch cover collapsed. Plaintiff logically argued
that since he was a seaman on his employer's barge, he was not
covered by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA); thus, under Aparicio v. Swan Lake,"° the Sieracki
unseaworthiness remedy remained available to him. The Fifth Cir-
cuit disagreed. As to the defendant's barge, the plaintiff was not a
seaman, as he lacked the required permanent connection. Conse-
quently, as to the defendant, he was engaged in maritime employ-
ment within the meaning of the LHWCA and was limited to a
negligence action under section 905(b). Plaintiff's relationship to his
employer's barge was "immaterial,"4 since whatever rights he may
have had against his employer, "the 'member of a crew' language in
section 905(b) clearly [referred] to the vessel that [was] charged with
negligence -here, [defendant's barge]. 42
36. 684 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Ward v. Director, 684 F.2d 1114 (5th
Cir. 1982).
37. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
38. 641 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1981).
39. 679 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1982).
40. 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981).
41. Burks, 679 F.2d at 76.
42. Id.
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Putting aside, for the moment, the wisdom of the decision, the
court's rationale is perplexing. Section 905(b) contains no "member
of the crew" language. That section refers to a "vessel," to "a person
covered under this chapter" (the LHWCA), and to other persons
"employed by the vessel." Section 902(2113 defines a "vessel" as in-
cluding the members of the crew of a vessel on which a person covered
by the LHWCA sustains injury. Neither of these sections furnishes
a statutory answer to the question: does a worker who is a seaman
on a vessel acquire LHWCA status, so as to prevent an unseaworthi-
ness action, when he is working temporarily aboard the vessel of
another? The issue is an important one because if the seaman is con-
sidered a maritime worker vis-a-vis the second vessel, his negligence
action against it may be barred by the second and third sentences
of section 905(b), a result which would not occur if the worker re-
tained seaman's status while temporarily working aboard the vessel
of another.
Seaman's Wages
46 U.S.C. § 596 obligates the master or owner of any vessel making
coasting or foreign voyages to pay a seaman the balance of his un-
paid wages within specified periods after he is discharged. Addition-
ally, it provides that "[elvery master or owner who refuses or neglects
to make [such] payment .. .without sufficient cause shall pay to the
seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for each and every day during
which payment is delayed . ...,,4' This penalty provision for failure
to pay wages upon discharge is a common one. Many states which
have adopted such a statute, however, have placed a ceiling on the
amount of penalty wages which the seaman may recover.5 Although
the maritime statute does not contain a limit on the amount of penal-
ty wages, lower federal courts consistently had assumed they had
judicial discretion to limit the penalty to a reasonable amount.40 This
was the approach taken by both the district court and the court of
43. 33 U.S.C. S 902(21) (1976).
44. 46 U.S.C. S 596 (1976).
45. CAL. LAB. CODE S 203 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE S 45-606 (1977 &
Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 44-315 (1981); LA. R.S. 23:632 (1950 & Supp. 1964); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. S 408.488 (West Supp. 1982-83); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 181.13 (West 1966);
OR. REV. STAT. S 652.150 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 260.10 (Purdon 1977); S.C. CODE
ANN. S 41-11-170 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 49.52.070 (1962).
46. E.g., McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1963); Carib-
bean Federation Lines v. Dahl, 315 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 831 (1963);
Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869
(1960); Prindes v. Steamship African Pilgrim, 266 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1959); Mavromatis
v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 179 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1950); Forster v. Oro Navigation
Co., 128 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd 228 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1955).
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appeals in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,47 a case in which the
seaman obtained employment with another shipowner about a month
after his discharge and did not bring his action for wages until two
years later. Although only $412.50 in wages were withheld, calcula-
tion of the double wages to the date of payment or the date of the
district court's judgment would have produced a penalty in excess
of $300,000. The Supreme Court granted writs and reversed the lower
courts, concluding that "[u]nder the plain language of the statute
• .. [the] decision to limit the penalty period was error." 8 While the
Court acknowledged that interpretation of a statute in a manner which
would produce an absurd result should be avoided if there is an alter-
native interpretation consistent with the legislative purpose, it.found
that Congress's purpose in enacting this statute-punishment of the
recalcitrant employer-would best be served by a literal application.
Like most important decisions, the Court's answer did not come
easily. One could have urged strong arguments for the employer, such
as that Congress had not looked at the statute in more than a half-
century. During that period, lower courts consistently had interpreted
the statute as permitting judicial discretion to tailor the punishment
to fit the crime. The congressional inaction, the judicial gloss on the
statute, and the trend in state law may have produced a justified
reliance by employers that if they lacked sufficient cause, the pen-
alty would be tailored to fit the crime. Perhaps a more important
argument was that the congressional purpose could actually be
thwarted by literal application of the statute. The penalty is not due
if there is "sufficient cause" for withholding payment. Therefore, a
trier of fact faced with the option either of imposing an exorbitant
penalty or no penalty at all is more likely to choose the latter path,
thus allowing the employer to escape any punishment. On the other
hand, a shipowner should not be permitted to use his vast economic
superiority to deprive the seaman of basic essentials, such as accrued
wages and maintenance and cure. The decision in Griffin removed
much of the temptation to do so.
Seaworthiness
In maritime law, the term "seaworthiness" connotes that a vessel
is reasonably fit for its intended use. The vessel's operator owes a
duty to provide a seaworthy vessel at certain times to various in-
terests, such as the seaman, the insurer, and the shipper of cargo
on the vessel. 9 He must furnish the seaman with a seaworthy vessel
47. 664 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 3245, 3253 (1982).
49. A vessel owner owes to a member of the crew the absolute duty to provide
19821
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at all times. If the seaman is injured by some condition of the vessel
that makes it unseaworthy, the operator is liable, even though he was
free from negligence and even though the condition arose on a voyage
or while the vessel was otherwise beyond the operator's personal
control."0
The owner of a vessel who lets it to another for the latter's use
may attempt to avoid the responsibility of providing a perpetually
seaworthy vessel to the crew by effecting a demise charter with the
user. Such a charter makes the charterer the operator of the vessel
and, consequently, imposes on him the duty of providing the crew
with a seaworthy vessel.51 Where the vessel is unseaworthy when the
demise charter commences, the owner may remain liable to third per-
sons injured by the condition, at least for some time thereafter.2
However, it generally has been accepted that the confection of a valid
demise charter relieves the owner of liability for any unseaworthy
condition arising after the charter commences. 3 The Fifth Circuit has
concluded otherwise. In Baker v. Raymond International, Inc.,54 the
court held that a seaman may recover in personam against the owner
of an unseaworthy vessel, although the vessel is subject to a valid
demise charter to a third person and the unseaworthy condition arises
after the charterer took possession.
The decision, although surprising, may not have far-reaching con-
sequences. Where a demise charter is perfected, the vessel remains
liable in rem for any unseaworthy condition causing harm to a
seaman.5 Thus a prudent owner ordinarily should secure insurance
protection against seamen's claims for unseaworthiness, at least in
an amount equal to the value of the vessel. Except for the unwary
shipowner, Baker may mean little more than additional clauses in, and
increased costs for, marine insurance policies.
a seaworthy vessel at all times. However, he owes to the shipper of cargo only the
lesser duty of using due diligence to send out a seaworthy vessel at the commence-
ment of the voyage. 46 U.S.C S 1303(1) (1976).
50. See generally 1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 33, S 23.
51. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, J 4-20 at 239.
52. See Nat G. Harrison Overseas Corp. v. American Tug Titan, 516 F.2d 89, 96
(5th Cir.), modified per curiam, 520 F.2d 1104 (1975); Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co.,
395 F. Supp. 978, 988 (E.D. La. 1975); Solet v. M/V Capt. H. V. Dufrene, 303 F. Supp.
980, 984 (E.D. La. 1969).
53. Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963); Cannella v. United States, 179
F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1950); see also Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163 F.2d 286 (1st Cir.
1947); Muscelli v. Frederick Starr Contracting Co., 296 N.Y. 330, 73 N.E.2d 536 (1947).
54. 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981).
55. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, § 4-24 at 242.
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LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Coverage
Prior to the 1972 amendments, a worker could fall within the
coverage of the LHWCA even though he was not engaged in maritime
employment at the time of injury. He was entitled to LHWCA benefits
if: (1) his employer had at least one employee who was engaged in
maritime employment and was therefore qualified as a maritime
employer and (2) the claimant-employee was injured on navigable
waters."6 The 1972 amendments expanded the covered "situs" from
navigable waters to adjoining piers, wharfs, docks, and other adjoin-
ing areas, ' but added the requirement that the worker must be en-
gaged in maritime employment at the time of injury.' As the Supreme
Court pointed out in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,59 an
employee is covered under the new Act only if he has both "status"
as a maritime employee and is injured on a covered "situs."
The statutory definition of an "employer" -"an employer any of
whose employees are employed in maritime employment""°-was not
changed in 1972, but the new requirement that the claimant must
himself be engaged in maritime employment makes superfluous any
further inquiry into whether the employer has any employee who is
engaged in maritime employment. Reaching the issue in Hullinghorst
Industries, Inc. v. Carroll,61 the Fifth Circuit correctly observed that
the "employer" requirement under the old act has been rendered
"largely tautological" 2 by the 1972 amendments. If a claimant is en-
gaged in maritime employment upon navigable waters at the time
of his injury, "it necessarily follows that . . .his employer .. . is
a statutory 'employer' within the meaning of the Act."63
Caputo and its progeny 4 provide that if a worker spends "at least
some of [his] time in indisputable longshoring operations," 5 he acquires
the "status" of a covered employee and retains that status even if
56. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 344, 339 (1953).
57. 33 U.S.C. S 903(a) (1976).
58. 33 U.S.C. S 902(3) (1976).
59. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
60. 33 U.S.C. S 902(4) (1976).
61. 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 758.
63. Id. at 759.
64. See, e.g., P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979); Howard v. Rebel Well
Serv., 632 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1980); Boudloche v. Howard Trucking Co., 632 F.2d 1346
(5th Cir. 1980); Thibodaux v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 580 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1978).
65. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273.
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he is engaged in nonmaritime employment at the time of injury. The
other side of the Caputo coin is that if a worker is engaged in maritime
employment at the time of injury, he is covered under the LHWCA,
even though his overall duties are nonmaritime. The Fifth Circuit
reached this conclusion during the 1981-82 term."6
Does drilling for oil and gas over navigable waters constitute
"maritime employment" within the meaning of the Act? The answer
to this question is irrelevant to two groups of offshore workers-
those who qualify as seamen and those engaged in offshore petroleum
production on the Outer Continental Shelf. The former group is en-
titled to the seamen's remedies and is ineligible for LHWCA benefits,
while the latter group falls within the coverage of the LHWCA by
virtue of a special provision in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 7
However, the answer is important to two other classes of workers-
those who are employed on submersible drilling rigs within state
waters but who lack seaman status and those working on fixed drill-
ing platforms within state waters. If these workers are not engaged
in maritime employment within the meaning of the LHWCA, their
claims against their employers for work-related injuries are gover-
ned by state workers' compensation.
The Fifth Circuit apparently has settled the issue for one of these
classes, "non-seamen" aboard movable drilling units. In Boudreaux v.
American Workover, Inc.,68 the court, sitting en bane, concluded that
such workers are covered by the Act for either of two reasons. One
is that the injury occurs on navigable waters and that fact, without
more, constitutes "maritime employment." The other reason is that
the work in which they are engaged (marine petroleum and extrac-
tion work aboard a drilling vessel in navigable waters) is sufficiently
related to maritime navigation and commerce to qualify as "maritime
employment." The Boudreaux court used simple logic to reach its con-
clusion that any injury occurring on navigable waters meets the
"status" requirement. The court reasoned that prior to 1972, any in-
juries on navigable waters were covered and the amendments adopted
in that year were intended to expand, not to contract, coverage. A
fortiori, injury on navigable waters is sufficient for coverage. The logic,
however, does not speak to the question which underlies every issue
of maritime jurisdiction: does this particular injury or type of injury
affect maritime shipping and commerce sufficiently to justify the ap-
plication of federal law and the resulting displacement of state law?
While most work-related injuries on navigable waters would provoke
66. See Gilliam v. Wiley N. Jackson Co., 659 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. 43 U.S.C S 1331 (1976).
68. 664 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1982) (reh'g en banc).
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an affirmative answer, a rigid rule of inclusion may not be advisable.
The approach adopted in Boudreaux has been rejected by at least one
other court,69 and the final decision may soon come from the Supreme
Court or Congress.
The Fifth Circuit's rationale probably would not aid the platform
worker within territorial waters. Such a worker usually lacks the re-
quisite connexity with a vessel and thus does not qualify as a seaman.
He also is not affected by the special statute extending LHWCA
benefits to platform workers on the Continental Shelf. If he is to fall
within the coverage of the LHWCA, he must have both "status" and
"situs." Although arguably he may be injured on a covered "situs,"
which is defined as an "area adjoining navigable waters," the
jurisprudence holds that the platform worker in territorial waters lacks
"status."7" Boudreaux and an earlier, similar decision 1 by the Fifth
Circuit apparently are limited to workers on movable drilling units.
In neither case did the court indicate that it would be willing to ex-
tend the concept of "maritime employment" to all offshore petroleum
production. In fact, such an extension arguably would be barred by
the Supreme Court's language in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.
7 2
Disability
The courts consistently hold that a claimant establishes a prima
facie case of disability if he shows that he cannot perform his former
job because of his work-related injury. 3 At that point, the burden
shifts to the employer to prove that there are other jobs which the
claimant could perform and thus he is not "disabled." Must the
employer show that a specific job awaits the claimant or is it suffi-
cient to show that there are jobs in the community which the claim-
ant realistically can perform and secure? The Fifth Circuit takes the
latter approach in New Orleans (Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner.74 The
court observes that the employer, in rebuttal of the claimant's prima
69. Churchill v. Perini North River Assocs., 652 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted
sub nom. Director v. Perini North River Assocs., 102 S. Ct. 1425 (1982).
70. Anderson v. McBroom Rig Bldg. Serv., Inc., 5 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 713,
No. 75-198 (Apr. 7, 1977); Toups v. Chevron Oil Co., 7 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 261,
No. 76-453 (Dec. 29, 1977).
71. Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981).
72. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
73. Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1980);
Base Billeting Fund, Laughlin Air Force Base v. Hernandez, 588 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1979); McCabe v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 602 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1979); Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, 592 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1979).
74. 661 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1981).
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facie case, may establish the types of jobs which the claimant is
capable of performing or is capable of being trained to perform, con-
sidering his age, background, and other relevant factors. The employer
then may show that within that category of jobs, there is employ-
ment reasonably available for which the claimant is able to compete
and which he realistically would be likely to secure. If it makes these
showings, the Fifth Circuit concludes, the employer has successfully
rebutted the presumption of disability.
Third Party Actions
A worker receiving benefits under the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act may maintain a tort action against
any tortfeasor who does not come within the umbrella of employer
tort immunity granted by the Act."5 However, if the worker fails to
bring an action against a third party within six months after accept-
ance of LHWCA benefits under an "award," the claim automatically
is assigned to his employer. Under Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping
Co.,77 the assignment is total and permanent and the right to sue the
third party does not revert to the worker if the employer does not
pursue the claim. Understandably, the tolling of this six-month period
has become a matter of immense importance to injured workers and
their counsel.
The issue which has attracted the most judicial fodder is the mean-
ing of an "award." Undoubtedly, an award made by an administrative
law judge, after formal claim and hearing, should satisfy the require-
ment. Conversely, acceptance of voluntary payments without the in-
tervention or participation of the Office of Worker Compensation Pro-
grams (OWCP) clearly should not qualify as an "award."78 However,
between these extremes there is a broad middle ground, including:
(1) payment after filing of a claim,"9 (2) payment under a compromise
agreement filed with the OWCP, and (3) payment after a conciliatory
conference provoked by the OWCP.8 1 Do any of these constitute ac-
75. 33 U.S.C. S 933(i) (1976). See generally 1 E. JHIRAD & A. SANN, BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY 5 28 (7th ed. 1981).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976).
77. 451 U.S. 596 (1981).
78. See Verderame v. Torm Lines, 670 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982); Klitznsky v. Pakistan
Shipping Corp., 530 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1981). But see Simmons v. Sea-land Serv.,
Inc., 676 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1982); Duris v. Erato Shipping, Inc., 684 F.2d 352 (6th Cir.
1982).
79. See Larson v. Associated Container Transp. (Australia) Ltd., 459 F. Supp. (E.D.
Va. 1978). But see Dunbar v. Retla S.S. Co., 484 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
80. See Perez v. Costa Armartori, S.P.A., 465 F. Supp. 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
81. See Panzella v. Skou, 471 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Sea Quest Marine,
Inc. v. Cove Shipping, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
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ceptance of benefits under an "award" and thus trigger the running
of the six-month period? The Supreme Court avoided a pronounce-
ment on this question in Rodriguez, and the decisions of lower courts
have been totally unsatisfactory. The matter is so unsettled that a
cautious claimant will file suit within six months of any payment where
the OWCP has been informed of, or has participated in, the process-
ing of the claim.
Limitation of Liability
46 U.S.C. S 185 provides that a person may assert limitation of
liability by filing a petition within six months of written notification
of a possible claim and must either deed the vessel to the United
States marshal or post a bond in the amount of the value of the vessel
at the conclusion of the voyage for which limitation is sought. Upon
compliance with these requirements, the court ordinarily will enjoin
the prosecution elsewhere of claims subject to the limitation,82 thus
effectively compelling the assertion of those claims in the limitation
proceeding.
The six-month period is jurisdictional. If the shipowner fails to
seek this remedy within the requisite time frame, he loses his right
to compel the litigation of all claims in one maritime forum.83 An
unanswered question is whether a shipowner loses his right to urge
limitation as a defense in some other proceeding if he fails to pro-
voke the concursus proceeding under section 185 within the six-month
period. Arguably, limitation can be urged only in federal court on the
admiralty "side"; thus once the six-month period has elapsed, limita-
tion may not be raised in any other manner or in any other court
and thus is lost. 4 However, some cases hold that a shipowner may
assert limitation as a defense in any court. Under this view, the only
thing lost by the expiration of the six-month period is the right to
concursus, i.e., to compel litigation of all of the claims in one pro-
ceeding. The Fifth Circuit reached this conclusion during the past year
in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge W-701.8"
The Signal court also addressed some questions which arise when
limitation is permitted as a defense in individual actions by claimants.
One such question is the time frame within which limitation must be
82. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, S 10-17 n.67, at 863.
83. See In re Goulandris, 140 F.2d 780 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944);
In re A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 268 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Grasselli
Chem. Co. No. 4, 20 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). But see Hudgins v. Gregory, 219
F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1955).
84. Thede, Statutory Limitations (Other than Harter and COGSA) of Carrier's
Liability to Cargo-Limitation of Liability and the Fire Statute, 45 TUL. L. REV. 959, 976
(1971).
85. 654 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1981).
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raised as a defense outside of the concursus proceeding. In Signal,
limitation was sought as a defense in federal court and the court con-
cluded that in such a case, the plea is timely if filed within the time
limit allowed for answers in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
even though that occurs more than six months after the shipowner
has received notice in writing of the claim.
Another issue is whether the shipowner who pleads limitation as
a defense outside of a concursus proceeding is required to post a
separate bond in the amount of the value of the vessel in each pro-
ceeding in which he asserts limitation as a defense. In Signal, multi-
ple claims were advanced against the shipowner in a single proceeding,
and the court of appeals concluded that in those circumstances a single
bond in the amount of the value of the vessel was sufficient. The court
thus did not reach the more difficult issue of whether a shipowner
must post separate bonds in each separate proceeding by individual
claimants. If such a conclusion is reached, then a shipowner whose
vessel has significant value after the accident or occurrence for which
limitation is sought could lose any effective limitation defense where,
as is often the case, each claimant files a separate suit.
PROCEDURE
Ancillary Jurisdiction
The doctrine of ancillary (or pendent) jurisdiction frequently is
applied to permit a federal court which lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate a state law claim where the claim is properly joined
with a claim under federal law.' Where the only basis of jurisdiction
over the federal law claim is 28 U.S.C. 5 1333, application of ancillary
jurisdiction over a joined state claim has been questioned.87 This hesita-
tion may stem from the fact that if ancillary jurisdiction is applied,
a defendant will not be entitled to trial by jury on the state law claim,
since a federal court whose jurisdiction over subject matter is pre-
mised solely upon the admiralty power may not provide a jury trial.
Since the state-claim defendant ordinarily would be entitled to a jury
trial in state court, application of ancillary jurisdiction would deprive
the litigant of the trial by jury to which he otherwise would be
entitled. The courts, however, have applied ancillary jurisdiction
without regard to the jury trial problem.8" In a significant decision,88
86. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS S 9, at 21 (3d ed. 1976).
87. Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction After the 1966 Unification,
74 MICH. L. REV. 1627, 1663 (1976).
88. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania de Navegacione
Almirante S.A., Panama, 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1971); Ohiio Barge Line, Inc. v. Dravo
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
89. Joiner v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 677 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1982).
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the Fifth Circuit upholds the application of ancillary jurisdiction, ob-
serving that "a third-party claim lacking independent grounds of
jurisdiction may be appended to an admiralty action and is cognizable
in federal court under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction so long
as the ancillary claim arises out of the same core of operative facts
as the main admiralty action."" The court also spoke of the procedure
to be applied where the maritime claim is dismissed prior to trial.
In such a case, the court observes, there is a strong presumption in
favor of dismissing the ancillary state law claims and dismissal is par-
ticularly warranted where the adjudication of the state law claim
would involve the federal court in "a complex and unsettled quadrant
of . . .state law." 91
90. Id. at 1041.
91. Id. at 1044.

